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Clinton: U.S. 'Deeply Regrets' Embarrassment of WikiLeaks Documents

US DEEPLY REGRETS WIKILEAKS DISCLOSURE ON THE AGE

Bernama – Fri, Mar 11, 2011

JAKARTA, March 11 (Bernama) -- The United States Secretary of State has said the United States deeply regrets the disclosure of any information that was intended to be confidential, "including private discussions between counterparts
or our diplomats personal assessments and observations", Indonesia''s Antara news agency reported.

The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, passed on her statement to the US ambassador to Indonesia, Scot Marciel, according to a press release from the US Embassy in Jakarta, Friday,
Hillary Clinton also said that the Department of State does not comment on materials, including classified documents,
which may have been leaked.

According to the release, the US official foreign policy is not set through these messages, but in Washington.

"Our official foreign policy is not set through these messages, but in Washington. Our policy is a matter of public record, as reflected in our statements and our actions around the world," said Marciel.

Further, Marciel said that any unauthorised disclosure of classified information by Wikileaks has harmful implications for the lives of identified individuals that are jeopardised, but also for global engagement among and between nations.

"Given its potential impact, we condemn such unauthorized disclosures and are taking every step to prevent future security breaches," he said.
"While we cannot speak to the authenticity of any documents provided to the press, we can speak to the diplomatic community`s practice of cable writing. By its very nature, field reporting to Washington is candid and often raw
information," he said.

Ambassador Marciel also said that it is preliminary, often incomplete and unsubstantiated. It is not an expression of policy, nor does it always shape final policy decisions. These documents should not be seen as having standing on their own or as representing US policy.
"This type of publication is extremely irresponsible and we express our deepest regrets to President Yudhoyono and the Indonesian people," Marciel said.

As President Obama has noted, the United States is fortunate to have a very strong partner in Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia`s first directly elected president, and a leader who has guided Indonesia through its journey into democracy, he added.

According to Marciel, Susilo`s leadership has been vital to promoting prosperity, expanding partnerships between the two nations` peoples, and deepening political and security cooperation.

"As the US President Barack Obama said in Jakarta during his visit in November 2010 to jointly launch with President Susilo Yudhoyono the Comprehensive Partnership, Indonesia and the United States are bound together by a web of historical, cultural, and economic ties that span the Pacific and by our shared values and aspirations, and our partnership is one of equals, grounded in mutual interests and mutual respect," he stated.

-- BERNAMA

 

 

 

Explosive WikiLeaks Cables Nail Yudhoyono

Written by Philip Dorling
Friday, 11 March 2011
US embassy in Jakarta has serious doubts about the Indonesian president's own integrity

When Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won a surprise victory in Indonesia's 2004 presidential elections, the United States Embassy in Jakarta hailed it as "a remarkable triumph of a popular, articulate figure against a rival [incumbent president Megawati Sukarnoputri] with more power, money, and connections."

The former army general and security minister has gone on to win international accolades for strengthening governance, promoting economic reform, and his efforts to suppress the Islamic militant group Jemaah Islamiyah.

While visiting Jakarta last November, US President Barack Obama applauded Indonesia's democracy and "the leadership of my good friend President Yudhoyono."

However Yudhoyono's record may have to be reviewed after secret US embassy cables, leaked to WikiLeaks and provided to Fairfax Media, reveal allegations of corruption and abuse of power that extend all the way to the presidential palace.

According to the diplomatic cables, Yudhoyono, widely known by his initials SBY, personally intervened to influence prosecutors and judges to protect corrupt political figures and put pressure on his adversaries. He reportedly also used the Indonesian intelligence service to spy on rivals and, on at least one occasion, a senior minister in his own government.

Yudhoyono's former vice-president reportedly paid out millions of dollars to buy control of Indonesia's largest political party, while the President's wife and her family have allegedly moved to enrich themselves on the basis of their political connections.

The US embassy's political reporting, much of it classified "Secret/NoForn" – meaning for American eyes only — makes clear that the continuing influence of money politics, which extends, despite the President's public commitment to combating corruption, to Yudhoyono himself.
The US embassy cables reveal that one of Yudhoyono's early presidential actions was to personally intervene in the case of Taufik Kiemas, the husband of former president Megawati Sukarnoputri. Taufik reportedly used his continuing control of his wife's Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI-P) to broker protection from prosecution for what the US diplomats described as "legendary corruption during his wife's tenure."

Taufik has been publicly accused, though without charges being laid against him, of improper dealings in massive infrastructure projects heavily tainted with corruption. He is believed to have profited from deals relating to the US$2.3billion Jakarta Outer Ring Road project, the US$2.4 billion double-track railway project from Merak in West Java to Banyuwangi in East Java, the US$2.3billion trans-Kalimantan highway, and the US$1.7 billion trans-Papua highway.

In December 2004, the US embassy in Jakarta reported to Washington that one of its most valued political informants, senior presidential adviser TB Silalahi, had advised that Indonesia's Assistant Attorney-General, Hendarman Supandji, who was then leading the new government's anti-corruption campaign, had gathered "sufficient evidence of the corruption of former first gentleman Taufik Kiemas to warrant Taufik's arrest."
However, Silalahi, one of Yudhoyono's closest political confidants, told the US embassy that the president "had personally instructed Hendarman not to pursue a case against Taufik."
No legal proceedings were brought against the former "first gentleman," who remains an influential political figure and is now speaker of Indonesia's parliament, the People's Consultative Assembly.

While Yudhoyono protected Taufik from prosecution, his then vice-president, Jusuf Kalla, allegedly paid what the US embassy described as "enormous bribes" to win the chairmanship of Golkar, Indonesia's largest political party, during a December 2004 party congress, US diplomats observed firsthand.
"According to multiple sources close to the major candidates, Kalla's team offered district boards at least Rp200 million (over US$22,000) for their votes," the US embassy reported. "Provincial boards — which had the same voting right, but also could influence subordinate district boards — received Rp500 million or more. According to one contact with prior experience in such matters, board officials received down payments ...and would expect full payment from the winner, in cash, within hours of the vote."
US diplomats reported that, with 243 votes required to win a majority, the Golkar chairmanship would have cost more than US$6 million.

"One contact claimed that [then Indonesian House of Representatives chairman Agung Laksono] alone — not the wealthiest of Kalla's backers — had allocated (if not actually spent) Rp50 billion (more than US$5.5 million ) on the event." The US embassy cables further allege that Yudhoyono had then cabinet secretary Sudi Silalahi "intimidate" at least one judge in a 2006 court case arising from a fight for control of former president Abdurahman Wahid's National Awakening Party (PKB). According to the embassy's contacts, Sudi told the judge "if the court were to help [Wahid] it would be like helping to overthrow the government."

The intervention of "SBY's right-hand man" was not successful in a direct sense because, according to embassy sources with close ties to the PKB and lawyers involved in the case, Wahid's supporters paid the judges Rp3 billion in bribes for a verdict that awarded control of PKB to Wahid instead of a dissident faction. However, Yudhoyono's strategic objective was achieved as external pressure on Wahid's "precarious position" forced the PKB to reposition itself to support the administration.
Other US embassy reports indicate that Yudhoyono has used the Indonesian State Intelligence Agency (BIN) to spy on both his political allies and opponents.

The president reportedly also got BIN to spy on rival presidential candidates. This practice appears to have begun while Yudhoyono was serving as co-ordinating minister of political and security affairs in former president Megawati's government. He directed the intelligence service to report on former army commander and Golkar presidential candidate Wiranto. Subsequently, at a meeting of Yudhoyono's cabinet, BIN chief Syamsir characterised Wiranto as a "terrorist mastermind."

Through his own military contacts Wiranto learnt that he was the subject of "derogatory" BIN reports, but when he complained he was told by presidential adviser TB Silalahi that no such reports existed.

The leaked US embassy cables are ambiguous on the question of whether Yudhoyono has been personally engaged in corruption. However, US diplomats reported that at a 2006 meeting with the chairman of his own Democratic Party, Yudhoyono "bemoaned his own failure to date to establish himself in business matters," apparently feeling "he needed to ‘catch up' ... [and] wanted to ensure he left a sizeable legacy for his children."

In the course of investigating the President's private, political and business interests, American diplomats noted alleged links between Yudhoyono and Chinese-Indonesian businessmen, most notably Tomy Winata, an alleged underworld figure and member of the "Gang of Nine" or "Nine Dragons," a leading gambling syndicate.

In 2006, Agung Laksono, now Yudhoyono's Co-ordinating Minister for People's Welfare, told US embassy officers that TB Silalahi "functioned as a middleman, relaying funds from Winata to Yudhoyono, protecting the president from the potential liabilities that could arise if Yudhoyono were to deal with Tomy directly."

Tomy Winata reportedly also used prominent entrepreneur Muhammad Lutfi as a channel of funding to Yudhoyono. Yudhoyono appointed Lutfi chairman of Indonesia's Investment Co-ordinating Board.

Senior State Intelligence Agency official Yahya Asagaf also told the US embassy Tomy Winata was trying to cultivate influence by using a senior presidential aide as his channel to first lady Kristiani Herawati.

Yudhoyono's wife and relatives also feature prominently in the US embassy's political reporting, with American diplomats highlighting the efforts of the president's family "particularly first lady Kristiani Herawati ...to profit financially from its political position."

In June 2006, one presidential staff member told US embassy officers Kristiani's family members were "specifically targeting financial opportunities related to state-owned enterprises." The well-connected staffer portrayed the President as "witting of these efforts, which his closest operators (e.g. Sudi Silalahi) would advance, while Yudhoyono himself maintained sufficient distance that he could not be implicated."

Such is the first lady's behind-the-scenes influence that the US embassy described her as "a cabinet of one" and "the President's undisputed top adviser."

The embassy reported: "As presidential adviser TB Silalahi told [US political officers], members of the President's staff increasingly feel marginalised and powerless to provide counsel to the President."

Yahya Asagaf at the State Intelligence Agency privately declared the first lady's opinion to be "the only one that matters."

Significantly, the US embassy's contacts identified Kristiani as the primary influence behind Yudhoyono's decision to drop vice-president Kalla as his running mate in the 2009 presidential elections.

With Bank of Indonesia governor Boediono as his new vice-presidential running mate, Yudhoyono went on to an overwhelming victory. The president secured more than 60 per cent of the vote, defeating both former president Megawati, who had teamed up with former special forces commander Prabowo Subianto, and vice-president Kalla, who allied himself with Wiranto.

In January 2010 the US embassy observed: "Ten years of political and economic reform have made Indonesia democratic, stable, and increasingly confident about its leadership role in south-east Asia and the Muslim world. Indonesia has held successful, free and fair elections; has weathered the global financial crisis; and is tackling internal security threats."

However, America's diplomats also noted that a series of political scandals through late 2009 and into 2010 had seriously damaged Yudhoyono's political standing.

A protracted conflict between the Indonesian police and the national Corruption Eradication Commission had damaged the government's public anti-corruption credentials, while a parliamentary inquiry into the massive bailout of a major financial institution, Bank Century, called into question the Vice-President's performance as former central bank governor.

One prominent anti-corruption non-government organization privately told the US embassy that it had "credible" information that funds from Bank Century had been used for financing Yudhoyono's re-election campaign.

Former vice-president Kalla strongly criticized the bailout, alleging that the Bank of Indonesia under Boediono had been negligent in supervising Bank Century and arguing that the bank should have been closed as its failure was due to fraud perpetrated by major shareholders.

Against this background the US embassy reported that Yudhoyono was increasingly "paralyzed" as his political popularity rapidly diminished.

"Unwilling to risk alienating segments of the parliament, media, bureaucracy and civil society, Yudhoyono has slowed reforms. He is also unwilling to cross any constituencies ...Until he is satisfied that he has shored up his political position, Yudhoyono is unlikely to spend any political capital to move his reform agenda, or controversial aspects of US -Indonesia relations, forward."

Over the past 13 years Indonesian democracy has undoubtedly strengthened. The Suharto dictatorship has been replaced by a competitive political system characterized by robust debate and free media.

However, as the leaked US embassy's reports show, in what is only a glimpse of the inside workings of President Yudhoyono's tenure, some of the secretive and corrupt habits of the Suharto years still linger in Indonesian presidential politics.

Another version of this story appeared in The Age in Melbourne, Australia.

 


Obama caved in on Kopassus
Philip Dorling and Nick McKenzie
December 17, 2010

INDONESIA threatened to derail a visit to Jakarta by President Barack Obama earlier this year unless he overturned the US ban on training the controversial Kopassus army special forces.

Leaked US State Department cables reveal that Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono privately told the US that continuing the ban - introduced in 1999 because of Kopassus's appalling human rights record, including killings in East Timor and West Papua - was the ''litmus test of the bilateral relationship'' between the US and Indonesia.

Six months later, the US agreed to resume ties with Kopassus, despite fierce criticism from some human rights groups and American politicians about Jakarta's failure to hold officers to account for their role in atrocities.
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The cables, released by WikiLeaks exclusively to The Age, detail US concerns about Indonesia's failure to prosecute the military personnel responsible for murder and torture during the conflicts in East Timor and Aceh.

But they also reveal that US diplomats in Jakarta believed that Mr Yudhoyono's demands should be met to ensure that Indonesia's military and security services would protect American interests in the region, including co-operation in the war on terror. It was also argued that closer military ties would encourage further reform of Indonesia's military.

The Indonesian leader's call to lift the Kopassus training ban is described in a January cable from the US embassy in Jakarta.

''President Yudhoyono (SBY) and other senior Indonesian officials have made it clear to us that SBY views the issue of Army Special Forces (KOPASSUS) training as a litmus test of the bilateral relationship and that he believes the … visit of President Obama will not be successful unless this issue is resolved in advance of the visit,'' the cable says.

US Defence Secretary Robert Gates said in July that the US needed to renew links with Kopassus ''as a result of Indonesian military reforms over the past decade, the ongoing professionalisation of the TNI, and recent actions taken by the Ministry of Defence to address human rights issues''.

An Australian expert on the Indonesian military, Australian Defence Force Academy associate professor Clinton Fernandes, said yesterday the cables appeared to show that members of Congress such as Senator Patrick Leahy - author of the 1999 ban on training with Kopassus - ''have not been told the real reason for Obama's decision, which was to provide photo opportunities for the President''.

''The decision to renew links shows contempt not only to the victims of gross human rights violations but to members of the US Congress,'' Professor Fernandes said.

US diplomatic cables from the past four years reveal that Jakarta's intense lobbying to lift the Kopassus ban was largely supported by the US embassy in Jakarta, which cited the Australian military's ties with Kopassus as a reason to lift the ban.

An April 2007 cable says that ''our Australian counterparts often encourage us to resume training for KOPASSUS''.

However, numerous cables also detail serious US concerns about resuming ties.

In October 2007, the embassy told Washington that ''Indonesia has not prosecuted past human rights violations in any consistent manner. While we need to keep Indonesia mindful of the consequences of inaction on TNI [Indonesian military] accountability, Indonesia is unlikely to abandon its approach. We need therefore to encourage the Indonesian government to take alternative steps to demonstrate accountability.''

Around the same time, another cable from the embassy noted that several high-ranking Indonesia officers had been promoted, despite questions about their involvement in past atrocities.

''In two cases (Muis and Zamroni), officers linked to human rights violations have been promoted to key positions,'' the cable said. ''Indonesian Defense Department contacts have told us the promotions for these two were delayed beyond the usual date because of their past activities. One case (Heryadi) may herald closer ties with China.''

Another 2007 cable details US concern about the appearance at a Kopassus anniversary celebration of Tommy Suharto, the notorious son of the former president who served several years in prison for arranging the killing of a judge who convicted him of fraud.

In May 2008, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, was briefed by US diplomats that ''the key impediment to expanded engagement remains the failure of the GOI [Indonesia] to press for accountability for past human rights abuses by security forces.

''The accountability issue stopped our planned engagement with the elite Army Special Forces (KOPASSUS) dead in its tracks and can be felt in other mil-mil [military-to-military] activities.''

The cable welcomes the Indonesian military's reforms but noted they were not ''the same as putting generals behind bars for past human rights abuses''.

In late 2009, about six months before the US lifted its Kopassus ban, US Under-Secretary for Defence Bill Burns told senior Indonesian officials that ''engagement with KOPASSUS continued to be a difficult and complex issue, particularly as there remained many in Washington, including in Congress, with serious concerns about accountability for past KOPASSUS actions''.

But the US cables also reveal the Jakarta embassy's efforts to water down the background screening that Indonesian military officers must undergo if they undertake training in the US.

The US embassy is also revealed in another cable as heavily playing down a 2009 report by Human Rights Watch that alleges Kopassus soldiers had committed recent human rights abuses in Papua.

The embassy called the report unbalanced and unconfirmed. It said that the abuses detailed did not appear to ''meet the standard of gross violation of human rights''.

''In these incidents, KOPASSUS personnel allegedly beat and kicked nine Papuans inside a KOPASSUS compound … Several cases involved Papuans who were drunk or engaged in disruptive behaviour near the KOPASSUS barracks.''

 

No coercion' on Kopassus
Toni O'Loughlin, Jakarta
December 20, 2010

THE Indonesian government has denied it threatened to derail US President Barack Obama's visit to Jakarta to pressure Washington into lifting its ban on training its controversial Kopassus army special forces.

The US announcement in July that it would remove its 12-year moratorium on training Kopassus, which has a history of abusing human rights, was based on mutual interest, Indonesian Defence Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro said.

''In the agreement that we signed, Indonesia and the US had the same position.
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''We did not force them,'' The Jakarta Globe reported Mr Yusgiantoro saying. ''We never did such a thing. Really there is nothing [to the reports],'' he said.

The US embassy in Jakarta also denied the reports. ''The President's visit was not conditioned on re-engagement with Kopassus,'' spokeswoman Corina Sander said.

But WikiLeaks cables from the US State Department show Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono privately told the US that continuing the ban was the ''litmus test'' of the relationship between the two nations.

The cables also show that US diplomats encouraged Washington to yield to Dr Yudhoyono's demands to ensure Indonesia's military and security services would protect US interests in the region.

They show that although US diplomats in Jakarta were concerned about resuming ties because of human rights violations, they played down credible reports by Human Rights Watch about such abuses.

''It was clear that our concerns were making them uncomfortable, but we always got a solicitous reception from them,'' Phil Robertson, HRW's deputy director for the Asia division, said of his organisation's discussions with the US embassy in Jakarta.

''Now what we have found as a result of WikiLeaks is that we put information out there and they were disparaging it,'' Mr Robertson said.

 

 

WIKILEAKS - Keeping You Informed!

 

President rejects corruption claim
Tom Allard, Jakarta
March 12, 2011

INDONESIA demanded, and received, an expression of regret from the US ambassador in Jakarta yesterday as President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono emphatically denied allegations in US diplomatic cables that he and his family were implicated in corruption.

The allegations, revealed in The Age yesterday and based on cables obtained by WikiLeaks, created a media storm in Indonesia as the country's foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, hauled in US ambassador Scot Marciel to formally lodge a ''strong protest''.

At an extraordinary and, at times, awkward press conference after the meeting, Mr Marciel declined to confirm or deny the veracity of the cables or comment on the specific allegations they contained.
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But he said, generally speaking, such cables contained ''candid and often raw information'' that was ''often incomplete and unsubstantiated''.

''We express our deepest regrets to President Yudhoyono and to the Indonesian people,'' he said, adding that the publication of the cables was ''extremely irresponsible''.

Mr Marciel abruptly left the press conference shortly afterwards, leaving Mr Natalegawa to answer questions alone.

Dr Yudhoyono, meanwhile, said The Age had breached the ''universal journalism code of ethics'' by publishing details of the cables without asking him for comment beforehand. ''The President is absolutely not happy with the false coverage, full of lies, run in The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age,'' according to a statement ''sent on behalf of the President'' by his senior spokesman, Daniel Sparingga. ''The content is full of sensation and disrespect, full of nonsense.''

The cables from the US embassy in Jakarta, sent between 2004 and 2010, contained a series of startling but unverified allegations about the conduct of Dr Yudhoyono, his wife and family. Among the allegations were that Dr Yudhoyono ordered a corruption investigation into political powerbroker Taufik Kiemas be dropped and that he received funds from controversial businessman Tomy Winata via a middleman.

 

Yudhoyono 'abused power'
PHILIP DORLING
March 11, 2011 - 4:03PM

SECRET US diplomatic cables have implicated Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in substantial corruption and abuse of power, puncturing his reputation as a political cleanskin and reformer.
The cables say Mr Yudhoyono has personally intervened to influence prosecutors and judges to protect corrupt political figures and pressure his adversaries, while using the Indonesian intelligence service to spy on political rivals and, at least once, a senior minister in his own government.

They also detail how Mr Yudhoyono's former vice-president reportedly paid millions of dollars to buy control of Indonesia's largest political party, and accuse the President's wife and her family of seeking to enrich themselves through their political connections.

The revelations come as Indonesian Vice-President Boediono visits Canberra today for talks with acting Prime Minister Wayne Swan and discussions with officials on administrative change to reform Indonesia's corrupt bureaucracy.
The US diplomatic reports — obtained by WikiLeaks and provided exclusively to The Age — say that soon after becoming President in 2004, Mr Yudhoyono intervened in the case of Taufik Kiemas, the husband of former president Megawati Sukarnoputri.

Mr Taufik reportedly had used his continuing control of his wife's Indonesian Democratic Party, then the second largest party in Indonesia's Parliament, to broker protection from prosecution for what the US diplomats described as "legendary corruption during his wife's tenure".

In December 2004, the US embassy in Jakarta reported that one of its most valued political informants, senior presidential adviser T.B. Silalahi, had advised that then assistant attorney-general Hendarman Supandji, who was leading the new government's anti-corruption campaign, had gathered "sufficient evidence of the corruption of former first gentleman Taufik Kiemas to warrant Taufik's arrest".
But Mr Silalhi, one of Mr Yudhoyono's closest political confidants, told the US embassy the President "had personally instructed Hendarman not to pursue a case against Taufik".
No legal proceedings were brought against Mr Taufik, an influential political figure who now serves as speaker of the People's Consultative Assembly, a largely ceremonial body representing members of parliament.

The US embassy also reported that then vice-president Jusuf Kalla allegedly paid "enormous bribes" to win the chairmanship of Golkar, Indonesia's largest party, during a December 2004 party congress.

The President's wife and relatives feature prominently in the US embassy's political reporting, with American diplomats highlighting efforts of the President's family "particularly first lady Kristiani Herawati . . . to profit financially from its political position". As early as 2006 the embassy commented to Washington that "first lady Kristiani Herawati is increasingly seeking to profit personally by acting as a broker or facilitator for business ventures . . . Numerous contacts also tell us that Kristiani's family members have begun establishing companies in order to commercialise their family's influence."

Highlighting the first lady's behind-the-scenes-influence, the embassy described her as "a cabinet of one" and "the President's undisputed top adviser".

Other leaked cables indicate Mr Yudhoyono has used the Indonesian State Intelligence Agency (BIN) to spy on his political allies and opponents.
According to a senior Indonesian intelligence officer, Mr Yudhoyono directed BIN chief Syamsir Siregar to instruct his officers to conduct surveillance on one of the most senior cabinet ministers, State Secretary Yusril Mahendra, while he made a secret trip to Singapore to meet Chinese businessmen.

The President also reportedly tasked BIN to spy on rival presidential candidates. Mr Silalah told US diplomats Mr Yudhoyono "shared the most sensitive BIN reporting on political matters only with himself and Cabinet Secretary Sudi Silalahi".
Although Mr Yudhoyono won a big victory in the 2009 election, US envoys quickly concluded he was running out of political puff. After political controversies through late 2009 and into last year led to his popularity taking a sharp fall, the embassy said the President was increasingly "paralysed". "Unwilling to risk alienating segments of the Parliament, media, bureaucracy and civil society, Yudhoyono has slowed reforms," it said.

 

Yudhoyono's top adviser a Timor war crimes suspect
Philip Dorling
March 12, 2011

THE United States has blackballed one of Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's closest advisers for alleged involvement in East Timor war crimes, according to leaked US diplomatic cables.
But Washington kept secret the reasons for denying a visa to former Indonesian army general Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, and President Yudhoyono subsequently appointed his friend deputy defence minister.
In September 2009, the US withheld the issue of a visa that would allow Mr Sjamsoeddin, a former army general then serving as a senior presidential adviser, to accompany President Yudhoyono, who was about to attend the G20 leaders summit in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Mr Sjamsoeddin was subject to a US Department of Homeland Security recommendation that he be denied entry owing to suspected involvement in "terror activities" and "extrajudicial killings''.
The US embassy cables leaked to WikiLeaks, and provided exclusively to The Saturday Age, show that the US embassy in Jakarta urged that Mr Sjamsoeddin still be allowed entry, lest the issue become an "irritant" in relations between Jakarta and Washington.

"We note that as a key adviser to the Indonesian President and possible cabinet appointee, Sjamsoeddin's travel to the United States would facilitate and strengthen US-Indonesian ties,'' the Jakarta embassy argued. "Sjamsoeddin provides guidance and counsel to President Yudhoyono on a number of issues of importance to the US, such as
mil[itary]-to-mil[itary] ties, which are a cornerstone of our efforts to ensure regional stability."


The allegations against Mr Sjamsoeddin included that, while serving as an Indonesian special forces commander in East Timor, he was responsible for directing the Santa Cruz massacre that claimed the lives of more than 250 East Timorese pro-independence demonstrators on November 12, 1991.

It was also alleged that Mr Sjamsoeddin was responsible for widespread violence committed by Indonesian troops in Dili after East Timor's August 30, 1999, independence ballot.

Mr Sjamsoeddin submitted a statement to the US embassy seeking to rebut the allegations, claiming that he had not been at the Santa Cruz massacre but had been rescuing ''journalists from Timorese [Indonesian army] officials who were angered that the journalists had accused them of being involved in clandestine activities''. Mr Sjamsoeddin also claimed he had been cleared by Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission for any wrongdoing in relation to the violence that swept Dili in September 1999.

Mr Sjamsoeddin's denials were accepted by the US embassy in Jakarta, which argued that "circumstantial evidence" linking Mr Sjamsoeddin to human rights violations was insufficient to deny him a visa. But this advice drew a sharp critique from the US embassy in Dili, which drew on United Nations and East Timorese human rights investigations to argue that Mr Sjamsoeddin repeatedly had command responsibility for Indonesian troops that committed atrocities.

The US embassy in Dili concluded that "Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin held senior positions of command responsibility in both 1991 and 1999, moments when atrocities undeniably occurred, and strongly indicate his personal culpability''.

 

 

 

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US Arms Sales to Indonesia

Australia relations

US support for Suharto

Australia and Indonesia

US and Indonesia

Indonesia-Australia Security Pact

US Yearly Arms Sales Table

Indonesian threat to Australia

US Arms Transfers

The Australian-Indonesia survey

US policy toward Indonesia

Australia's secret support 1966

Crack in U.S. Indonesia relations

In Focus: Indonesia after Suharto

US relations: Commerce first

U.K. Arms Trade

US worries about financial crisis

International Arms Trade

Suharto: Valued servant of the U.S.

Foreign Military Relations

Clinton call to Suharto

Human Rights and Foreign Policy

US-Indonesia Society

Public Order

Clinton's foreign financiers

Foreign Missions

Washington File Indonesia & Timor

Indonesian Diplomatic Missions

United Nations in Indonesia

Visa Services

What Asian Crisis?

Habibie on relations

Background Australia relations

Australia Relations & Implications

US orchestrated 1965 slaughter

Canberra dithers Post-Suharto

US Policy 1961-1965

US: Re-evaluating policies

Surrendering to symbols 1964-65

The RFK mission 1962-1963

US policies : Introduction

US policy 1963-1964

US funding for opposition

US intervention

Focus of Australian interest

US: What next for Indonesia?

Our man in Jakarta

US: Testimony on Indonesia

Fostering relations after Suharto

Ignoring the roots of violence

Australia - From bad to worse

Response to Sen Patrick Kennedy

1996 US-Indonesia relations

US Military Support

Strange Bedfellows

Opportunities & Pitfalls for the US

Averting a New Kosovo

US policy, May 1997

US Security Strategy E.Asia Pacific

Arming Indonesia

Indonesia a Threat to Australia?

Australian Perceptions

Analysis of Threat to Australia

American Pitbull

At a turning point with US

Wahid urges summit with Australia

Australia: Rebuff from Jakarta

Australian Relations

No time for Australia visit

US parameters 1960-1967

Japan-Indonesia relations

Australian military ties

History of Australian ties

Australia : Blood for Oil

Wiranto singing "Feelings"

Battle for the Soul of Indonesia

NYT Special: The CIA in Iran

Britain's role in ousting Sukarno

Australia: Strategic policy

Australia's balancing act

US Relations 1996

Econ relations with Switzerland

Singapore: A Cold blast from Jakarta

Australia Indonesia relations

Crisis changing players

East Timor and regional security

In Focus: Indonesia

Washington on Wahid

Forced smiles in S.E.Asia

Wahid plays the Asia card

Defence cooperation in limbo

Australia's role in Asia

Telling tales on Australia

Re-thinking military ties with US

Indonesia India China Alliance?

US shifts focus to Indonesia

US, Australia, Indonesia

Indonesia - Strategic implications 

Indonesia India Iran

Malaysia scolds Indonesia

Territorial waters and Singapore

Indonesian tangle and the US

Indonesia and Middle East

US wary of Indonesia ties with China

Kissinger new Presidential Adviser

Clinton renews call for reform

Crisis-Challenge for US leadership 

The real Indonesia scandal 

Wahid visit to UK

Indonesia Malaysia

Wahid postpones Australia visit

Indonesia needs us (Australia)

Wahid will visit Australia

Indonesia Australia and Ec Crisis

Australia and Indonesia 

WSJ-Clinton's financial backers

History of Australia relations

Indonesia - What the US must do 

Australia's role in Asia

Iran opposes Iindonesia interference

US Aid Mission revives ties

Who bombed Philippine ambasador? 

Local insurgencies go global 

Singapore optimistic

Australia-Rough weather ahead 

Mid-East Peace Plan 

Seeking end to Iraq sanctions 

Australian business and Indonesia

Australian Labor Part & Suharto Junta

Tension mounts over oil-rich E Timor

US Arms sales to Indonesia

Averting a new Kosovo in Indonesia

Right not to meddle in civil unrest 

Suharto got Clinton kickbacks 

US Stanley Roth on Indonesia 

US-Fact finding team on riots

Foxes in the hen-house

The Consortium 

Australia's underside

US responsibility in Indonesia 

US-Australia 1954-1962 

US deploys warships to E Timor 

Strengthening ties with China

Diplomatic Economic Backlash 

Military Embargo blamed 

Australia : Accusation inappropriate 

Indonesia needs friends and money 

US Indonesia relations 1996

 US Indonesia relations 1997

US Arms Profile-Indonesia

 

 

 

 

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